In the spring of 2001, an ambitious dredging project was kicked off in Massena, New York. The objective: remove an estimated 77,000 yd 3 of PCBcontaminated sediment from the St. Lawrence River opposite the former Reynolds Metals Company St. Lawrence Reduction Plant. A 3800-ft long sheet pile wall to isolate the remediation area from the river was installed, within which contaminated sediment were dredged using specialized clamshell buckets and hauled ashore for dewatering, processing and disposal. The project was exquisitely detailed and diagramed, from the expected percentage of analytical variability in sediment PCB analyses down to the timing, in minute and seconds, of each bucket cycle, for the work had to be accomplished in one season--the sheet pile wall had to be pulled and equipment demobilized before the river froze.
the silt curtain and limited circulation of turbid waters within the enclosure. The project had an ambitious schedule: owing to the severity of winters in the Massena area, in particular the significant ice accumulations on he St. Lawrence and its tributaries, the containment systems had to be installed, the dredging completed (as well as any capping that might be needed), and the containment systems removed all in a single construction season (April-November).
Three derrick barges were used as dredges, each with a lattice-boom conventional crane. The cranes were outfitted with Cable Arm TM environmental clamshell dredge buckets and the WINOPS dredge positioning system. A material handler with a hydraulic clamshell was also used for dredging in selected areas. Five material barges with filter bed dewatering systems were used as scows for dredge spoils. The scows were unloaded at a specially constructed dock facility and placed in trucks for transport to sediment dewatering and storage pens or the onsite landfill, depending on PCB concentration. Dredging was conducted on a near-continuous basis, beginning in mid June, with two 10-hour shifts per day.
The dredge area was divided into a total of 268 cells, each with a specified target depth of excavation. Dredging performance and progress was tracked using WINOPS, which collected information on each bucket, including "XY" position using Differential Global Positioning System equipment, and depth of cut ("Z") using depth sounders and pressure transducers on the Cable Arm TM bucket. After each dredge pass, sediment verification samples were collected and tested for PCBs using immunoassay analyses in the field and laboratory analyses at offsite labs. Additional dredge passes were completed as needed to remove contaminated sediment down to the cleanup goal of 1 ppm PCBs. Onshore sediment handling entailed the unloading and stockpiling of sediment identified as potentially containing >50 ppm PCBs for subsequent characterization and disposal. Sediments identified as having <50 ppm PCBs were taken directly to the onsite landfill for disposal. All sediments were stabilized with Portland cement to allow for handling and either offsite transport or placement and compaction in the onsite landfill.
A total of 65,500 m 3 (85,600 yd 3 ) of sediment containing 9,180 kg (20,197 lbs.) of PCBs was eventually removed from the river. Approximately two-thirds (177) of the 268 dredge cells were successfully remediated to less than 1 ppm PCBs; 39 more were remediated to less than 2 ppm. Average concentrations of PCBs in the sediment across the entire site were well below 5 ppm. Fifteen cells, comprising an area of 0.44 ha (1.1 acres), with final PCB levels >10 ppm were covered with an interim cap consisting of 30.5 cm (12 in.) of gravel. Follow-on work is planned for 2002 to complete the capping activities.
LESSONS LEARNED
Because of its ambitious schedule (in and out of the river in one season), the St. Lawrence Remediation Project was exquisitely detailed and diagramed, from the expected percentage of analytical variability in sediment PCB analyses down to the timing, in minute and seconds, of each bucket cycle. Planning for the project spanned a period of almost 8 years, beginning soon after the ROD was signed in September 1993 and continuing almost up to the minute when the first dredge bucket hit the water in June 2001.
The project encountered difficulties from the start: none of locally available labor had any experience installing sheet pile walls on land, much less in the water. More significant problems arose on an almost daily basis once the dredging began-the water was too shallow for the larger barges and tugboat, the sediment was not freely draining, almost all of the verification samples from the initial group of cells that were dredged showed that contamination remained above the cleanup goals, etc. In the end, work was driven as much by the Contingency Plan as it was by the Final Design and Work Plans.
Many lessons were learned in the process of execution of the St. Lawrence River remediation project. Most of these were learned the hard way-that is, they resulted in additional costs, delays or other complications to the job. The following discussion examines these in detail.
Bathymetry and Navigational Dredging
Bathymetric surveys completed during the initial characterization studies and remedial design identified a highly irregular bottom topography in the remediation area. The irregular bottom was due to the dumping of dredge spoils in the area during construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway in the late-1950's. These surveys had identified high spots and shallow water areas that were expected to interfere with navigation and dredging during the remediation. Consequently, a limited amount of navigational dredging was anticipated. This amount was not quantified in the design but it was generally thought to consist of a day or two of dredging. It was thought that most of the problems could be avoided by "light-loading" of the sediment scows.
Considerably more navigational dredging was conducted than expected. The project ended up devoting the better part of 13 rig days (each a 10-hour shift) to navigational dredging, between June 12 and July 6. One of the main drivers for the navigational dredging was that one of the tugboats supplied by the dredging contractor required nearly 2.1 m of draft. Given the highly irregular bottom topography, no amount of additional bathymetric surveying could have eliminated all uncertainty regarding water depths. To compensate, navigational dredging was expanded to all areas where there was even a hint of a high spot.
The draft requirements of all of the vessels to be used for the remediation work should have been identified as early as possible and reconciled with the available water depths to better the suitability of the vessels for use at the site as well as navigational dredging requirements. An evaluation of whether the benefits of having deep-drafting vessels justified the extent of navigational dredging necessary for their use at the site could have resulted in the use of alternative vessels and reduced the navigational dredging requirements.
Inexperienced Craft
Nearly all of the construction personnel for work on the river were local hires. Unfortunately, this work force had essentially no experience working on the water, either installing sheet pile or dredging, even though the local unions had promised to provide experienced personnel. The dredging contractor (Faust) was able to provide a few experienced operators and foremen at the beginning of the job, who essentially ran a school for sheet piling, dredging, barge handling and tugboat piloting.
The project team should have devoted more effort during the pre-mobilization activities toward locating, and retaining, qualified, experienced craft. The need for training of the locally hired craft should have been anticipated and a more structured program should have been developed.
Dredging Performance/Operational Efficiency
The project schedule assumed an 60 percent efficiency rating for dredging operations-that is, that the dredges would actually be filling the scows with sediment 6 hours out of every 10 hour shift. Actual operational rates were somewhat lower, averaging only 38 percent (Figure 1 ).
Figure 1. Predicted vs. Actual Dredging Operational Efficiency
In the field, it was readily apparent to even the casual observer that work was perhaps not being executed as efficiently as possible. Although there were 3 derrick barges for dredging, more often than not only one or two would be actively dredging at any given moment. Early on, it was assumed that the problems were related to the equipment being used, most of which was well past its prime. And, in fact, a lot of time and money did go into repairs for the equipment, but this was not the principal contributor to the overall inefficiency of the dredging operation.
An analysis of the primary contributors to down-time during dredging operations is summarized in Figure 2 . The categories shown capture essentially all the reasons why the dredges were not dredging even though they were fully manned, fueled and on the time clock to do dredging. Down-time was related to a number of factors, some were related to the equipment being used, which could have been reduced or eliminated during the procurement cycle (e.g., requiring the dredging subcontractor to bring better quality equipment). Others were related to site conditions (e.g., weather, draining excess water from the scow) not easily controlled. Many of the largest contributors to could have been addressed through better management of operations on the river.
Figure 2. Principal Contributors to Down-Time During Dredging
More emphasis should have been placed on the choreographing of crew changes and movement of the derrick barges and sediment scows, which together accounted for nearly 50 percent of the dredging down time. There were 3 tugboats, which should have been more than enough to keep the dredges supplied with scows, but each tug had limitations, whether draft-related or sizerelated, that often prevented their efficient utilization. It was often the case that the tug needed to move a certain scows or derricks was not available, so dredging was put on hold. A more versatile tugboat fleet capable of operating throughout the remediation area would have helped.
Better oversight of the tugboat operations, with continuous tracking of derrick and scow status, would have helped even more.
Maintenance and calibration also accounted for a significant component of down time, and much of this occurred at the beginning of each shift. An attempt was made to schedule maintenance work for periods when it would not interfere with the dredging but as shown on the graph this effort was not very successful. The decrepit nature of much of the equipment obviously increased the amount of maintenance time, and the use of newer or better quality equipment would have helped. Calibration was an integral-and unavoidable-component of the integrated Cable Arm -WINOPS system, and was conducted by the marine technicians at the start of each shift. Having the marine tech's start their shift 30 minutes before the dredging crew arrived at the barge could have reduced the impact.
The electronic sensors, control units, and software related to the Cable Arm and WINOPS systems are quite complicated and almost as much time was spent trying to isolate the problems as it took to fix them. The problems were ameliorated somewhat by adding a full-time technician from Cable Arm about midway through the dredging. Even so, the inherent sensitivity of this equipment-necessary to get accurate data-increases the amount of repair, replacement and fiddling with the equipment; having the expert on site accelerated the repairs but did not decrease the frequency of such incidents. No easy fix for this problem was apparent.
Persistent Contamination and Redredging
The design, work plan and schedule assumed that about a third of the dredge cells would require redredging a second time, and that only about 10 percent of these would need a third or fourth pass. Considerably more redredging was conducted than expected ( Figure 3) . Half of the cells required more than one dredge pass, and about 40 percent of these required 3 or more passes.
Figure 3. Predicted vs. Actual Redredging Effort
The persistence of contamination in the sediment was attributed to site-specific bottom conditions and the limitations of the dredging technology employed at the site. There were a lot of rocks and obstructions that impacted the performance of the Cable Arm TM bucket. In addition, once the soft sediment was removed, a hard bottom composed of stiff silty clays, glacial till and/or gravel was exposed, all of which prevented additional challenges to the Cable Arm TM bucket. Previous dredge passes had essentially rendered these areas no longer amenable to dredging. Variability in the sediment matrix and sample analyses was also a factor that drove additional redredging decisions (variability is discussed below).
Alternative dredging techniques, involving the use of a conventional rock bucket on the derrick barges and a hydraulic clamshell on a Caterpillar 350 Material Handler were used. These alternative methods successfully removed a significant quantity of contaminated sediment but were not designed for environmental applications, which led to considerable hand wringing and concern about recontamination of nearby cells. Even these alternative methods could not remove all of the contaminated sediment from the bottom, and in the end 12 dredge cells had to be capped due to PCB concentrations >10 ppm.
Verification sampling data showed that additional dredge passes did not necessarily translate into progress toward attaining the cleanup goals, as shown in Figure 4 . In fact, additional dredging often resulted in a worsening of contamination levels ("getting worse" on the chart).
Figure 4: Overall Dredging Progress Based on Verification Sampling Results
A point of diminishing return was obviously reached somewhere after the 5 th or 6 th dredge pass, but the project team continued to believe that "just one more pass" would clean the cell. Fortunately, there were only about a dozen dredge cells that received more than 6 dredge passes, so the magnitude of these efforts was limited. The project team should have identified criteria for stopping the redredging and proceeding with the capping effort. The additional dredging was not a complete waste of time, however, as it did reduce the number of cells that were eventually capped and resulted in the removal of more contaminated sediment and PCB mass from the river.
Analytical and Matrix Variability
The sediment verification samples collected and analyzed for PCBs exhibited a much greater level of matrix and analytical variability than expected. There was a lot of split sampling with the regulators and a fair amount of resampling to address regulator concerns regarding recontamination of cells previously shown to be clean due to dredging in nearby cells. The project team conducted a detailed evaluation of the variability in sediment sampling results, which was documented in the Interim Completion Report for the project.
One of the primary conclusions from this evaluation was that the more times a cell is sampled (with no change in dredging status) or the more times a given sample is divided (split) and analyzed, the greater the chance of obtaining an alternative PCB value-it may be higher, or it may be lower, but it is going to be different, by a few percentage points or as much as an order of magnitude. If the results from a particular sampling event were not favorable, collection of another sample, or analysis of another aliquot from the same sample, provided an excellent opportunity for obtaining a substantially different sampling result. The problem with this approach is that there was really no way to select one value as being better or more accurate than the other-assuming the labs followed standard methodologies and the samples were collected in accordance with proper procedures-the numbers were just different (see Figure 5 ).
Given the variability inherent to the matrix, analytical methods, and between laboratories, it was clear that additional sampling and analysis was going to identify different concentrations of PCBs. In the end, however, these additional data did not eliminate the uncertainty associated with sediment PCB analyses. The project team made based decisions (for redredging or disposal of sediment) based on the maximum PCB result obtained from any of the various analyses that were being conducted.
Figure 5. Variability in Split Sediment Samples
The flow sheet logic developed for the project (discussed in a separate paper) attempted to incorporate the analytical and matrix variability inherent to sediment PCB analyses. Its purpose was to define the conditions under which additional dredge passes would be conducted. As it turned out, there was significantly higher variability in the sediment sampling results than envisioned by the flow sheet logic. Moreover, the logic did not factor the results of split samples into the decision-making process.
The lesson learned here was that much greater variability in sampling results should have been anticipated. The extent of split sampling with the oversight personnel should have been discussed in greater detail beforehand and factored into the decision process.
Sediment Handling Characteristics
The design boldly predicted that 40 percent of the sediment dredged from the remediation area would be as much as free draining while the remaining 60 percent would require additional time or even treatment using stabilization agents such as Portland cement. These estimates were somewhat optimistic (Figure 6 ). In fact, very little of the dredged sediment was free draining, which lead to a major revamping of on-shore sediment processing activities.
The sediment was so wet that it essentially had to be ladled out of the scows and into Terex trucks at the East Dock unloading facility. The trucks transported the soupy material with 50 ppm PCBs to the Sediment Storage Area (SSA) or River Drying Beds, where it was poured into sediment holding pens or drying beds. Sediment with <50 ppm PCBs was transported to the onsite landfill where it was poured into temporary holding basins. The high water content of the sediment impacted the entire spectrum of sediment handling activitities. It took longer to unload the barges; the Terex trucks had to be light loaded to avoid slopping sediment over the sides and tailgate, and special closure devices had to fabricated to seal the gasketed tailgates; the size of the stockpiles in the SSA was limited because the material spread out rather than piled up, which increased the number of stockpile characterization samples that had to be collected; pits had to be dug into the landfill to create holding basins in which the material could be stabilized.
All of the sediment had to be stabilized with Portland cement. To stabilize the 65,500 m 3 of wet sediment, a total of 11,950 metric tons of Portland cement were used, amounting to 12 percent cement by volume and15 percent by weight. In addition to added costs for Portland, the stabilization efforts resulted in extensive double and even triple handling of the sediment. Considerable expense and efforts had also been expended to include a grizzly in the sediment unloading process for separation of oversize material, which was to be washed rather than landfilled or shipped for offsite disposal. The sediment was too wet to put through the grizzly.
Estimates of the drainage characteristics of the sediment were based on extensive geotechnical studies conducted during the design. Drainage tests were conducted using bulk sediment collected by divers from the remediation area. In addition, several dozen split-spoon samples were subjected to particle size analyses, from which drainage characteristics could also be inferred. The sediment was primarily a granular material of sand, silt and gravel.
Discrepancies between the expected and actual drainage characteristics of the sediment were attributed to the fact that the sediment collected for the geotechnical testing did not adequately simulate the physical changes that occur through dredging. The dredging process caused a significant change in the texture-and water content-of the sediment. The sediment also had considerably more fines or organic matter than expected, which caused it to retain the water added when it was excavated from the bottom.
Even after stockpiling in a sediment pen or placed in a drying bed (which had an underdrain system specifically designed to facilitate sediment dewatering), the material did not really drain. A dried crust would form on the surface of the material after a day or two, but the interior of the stockpile remained a soft, wet muck. The project did not have the ability to conduct long-term drainage tests but it is likely that several weeks would have been needed for full dewatering of the sediment.
The project would have benefited from a small pilot study that examined both the effectiveness of the dredging technology in removing sediment from the bottom as well as the physical characteristics of the resulting dredge spoil. Sediment generated from a pilot scale dredging operation-using the Cable Arm bucket-would have more closely simulated the material obtained during the full-scale operation and provided a better indication of the drainage characteristics of the sediment.
Environmental Monitoring
The Environmental Monitoring Plan for the project underwent extensive reviews and revisions, like all the project planning documents. The monitoring program was judged to be fairly comprehensive and addressed all major environmental media of concern: air, water, and sediment. A specialty subcontractor was hired specifically to do the monitoring, which included the sediment verification sampling.
Regulatory oversight in the field focused much of their attention on the environmental monitoring activities. This heightened level of scrutiny ultimately lead to a greatly expanded environmental monitoring program as summarized in Table 1 . In some cases, the expanded activities were in response to monitoring results or other field conditions, but in other cases were due to concerns from nearby or downstream communities. These mandated changes in planned monitoring activities greatly increased both the cost and complexity of the overall project. The additional cost of the expanded environmental monitoring activities is included in Table 1 ; what is not shown is the increase in downstream costs that accompany such monitoring-namely the costs for data management, data validation and for incorporating the monitoring results into the Completion Report. 
Proximity of Boundary Air monitoring Stations to Work Areas
A pre-existing air monitoring station was used for boundary air sampling during the dredging and sediment handling activities. The station was only about 25 m away from the sediment pens of the SSA, which is where the wet sediment was stockpiled, sampled, stabilized, and loaded into trucks for transport to the disposal site ( Figure 7 ). In addition, the station was a couple hundred meters inside the property boundary, not the ideal location for identifying possible air impacts on offsite receptors, which was one of the primary objectives of the boundary air monitoring effort. The proximity of the monitoring station to the active work area of the SSA was not thought to be a problem, as PCBs are not volatile and the sediment pens were to filled with wet sediment, so even dust was also not going to be an issue (even freely draining sediments would have retained some moisture). For the first month and a half or so of dredging, the monitoring station did not show any air quality problems. Life was good.
Beginning in early August, PCBs started being detected in the air samples and the first exceedances of the action level for PCBs in air were identified (the action levels were several orders of magnitude below the OSHA PEL). The exceedances were attributed to wind-borne transport of PCB-contaminated dust from the adjacent SSA, as the weather was sunny and hot and the exposed surfaces of the sediment stockpiles were drying out. Various mitigation measures were taken, including covering the stockpiles, using water trucks to minimize dust, using water sprays during sediment handling activities, and expanded housekeeping efforts to clean dried sediment from exposed surfaces. These efforts were only partially successful, as the pattern of exceedances continued. Several stockpiles were relocated to another storage site in early September, which helped, but the problem reappeared in early October.
In order to determine whether the action level exceedances at the SSA monitoring station were resulting in offsite releases of PCBs, a supplemental boundary air monitoring station was established on the actual property boundary (Figure 7) . PCB results from this station confirmed what earlier monitoring at the property boundary (based on air samples collected with personal air pumps) had shown, namely that the airborne PCB contamination identified in the SSA monitoring station was a localized problem that did not translate into significant offsite releases. There were no exceedances of PCB action levels at the property boundary monitoring station.
The lesson learned here is that the location of air monitoring stations should reflect the intended use of the data derived from the station. The SSA station was useful in providing information needed to verify proper health and safety protocols for site workers engaged in sediment handling activities in the SSA (the data confirmed that there were no exceedances of OSHA limits). The station was not useful as an indicator of offsite air quality impacts, which is how the data were initially used as there were no other downwind stations between the SSA and property boundary.
Key Demobilization Decision Not Defined
The design and work plans for the project made a valiant attempt to anticipate all of the major decision points and define the basis or criteria for such decisions. An oversight in this process was discovered, essentially at the eleventh hour of the project. It was late October, dredging and capping had been completed and it was time to start removing the sheet pile wall. The schedule indicated that if removal of the wall started in the third or fourth week of October that there was just enough time to pull all of the steel out of the river, get the equipment decontaminated, and ship the barges and tugboats back up through the Great Lakes to their home ports in Michigan before the onset of severe weather (a major concern for transiting the Great Lakes).
It was assumed, based on the hundreds of water column samples collected during dredging operations that showed no impact on water quality in the St. Lawrence River, and the more than 200 water intake samples collected during dredging that showed no impact on downstream water supplies, that the wall could be removed with little fanfare. Monitoring of water quality in the St. Lawrence River would occur during removal of the sheet pile wall, per the EPA-approved Environmental Monitoring Plan (EMP), but neither the design nor the EMP identified any specific sampling results or other criteria that would serve as the trigger to allow for removal of the wall to begin.
As the derrick barges were being refitted to start pulling the king piles and sheeting, the project team was informed by the regulatory oversight personnel that the wall could not be removed until various water quality criteria had been met inside the sheet pile enclosure. The concern was that removal of the wall would unleash a giant slug of contaminated water, potentially impacting water quality in the St. Lawrence River. A prolonged sampling program ensued, and 2½ weeks later permission was obtained to begin removing the wall.
The lesson here is an obvious one. All key decision points must be identified ahead of time and the basis or criteria upon which actions are taken must be clearly defined. The project team should have identified removal of the sheet pile wall as a key decision point, if not in the work plan then during the dredging activities, and defined the sampling activities or water quality results that would be used to determine whether to proceed with the removal.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite a number of hurdles, the dredging was successfully completed, the sheet pile wall was removed from the river, and all the equipment was returned safely to its home base. Safety performance was a particularly noteworthy accomplishment. The project had nearly half a million job hours without a lost work day or OSHA-recordable incident, even though at its peak there were two 10-hour shifts per day employing over 150 construction personnel engaged in a multitude of potentially dangerous tasks.
From an environmental perspective, the project also recorded a significant accomplishment: a 99 percent reduction in PCB concentrations through the removal of approximately 65,500 m 3 of contaminated sediment containing an estimated 9,180 kg of PCB mass. Although there were come complications regarding the attainment of cleanup goals for some of the dredge cells, the overall success of the project is not in dispute. An abbreviated field effort is planned for 2002 to complete the subaqueous cap over a small area (0.44 hectares) that could not be remediated to below 10 ppm PCBs.
